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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintifi7Appellee, 
v. 
LARRY YAZZIE CLY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Appeal No. 20060788-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
UTAH CODE ANN. §77-18a-1(1 )(a) (2003) and UT.R.APP. P. 3(a) provide this Court's 
jurisdiction over this appeal from the Judgment and Order of Commitment to Utah State 
Prison entered on July 31,2006 (the "Judgment"), by the Seventh Judicial District Court in 
and for San Juan County, State of Utah, in this case involving three third-degree felony 
convictions from a court of record. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE I: Was the evidence sufficient to support a conviction on the charges of 
third degree felony Child Abuse? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review for a sufficiency of the 
evidence claim "is highly deferential to a jury verdict." State v. Workman. 2005 UT 66,t 29, 
122 P.3d 639. "[This Court] begin[s] by reviewing 'the evidence and all inferences which 
may be reasonably drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" Id. (citations 
omitted). "[This Court] will reverse a jury verdict for insufficient evidence only if [it] 
determinefs] that 'reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict.'' Id. (citations 
omitted). Stated another way, "[this Court] will reverse a jury verdict only when, after 
viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
verdict, [it] find[s] that the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so 
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. 
Lopez. 2001 UT App 123,110,24 P.3d 993. 
ISSUE II: Did the trial court err in failing to submit the requested jury instruction 
to the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Whether a trial court improperly denied a requested 
jury instruction is a question of law that an appellate court reviews for correctness, giving no 
deference to the trial court conclusions." State v. Harper. 2006 UT App 178,136 P.3d 1261. 
ISSUE ni: Did the trial court err in failing to merge the charges of Child Abuse 
and Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Merger issues present questions of law, which this 
Court reviews for correctness. State v. Diaz. 2002 UT App 288, |10, 55 P.3d 1133, citing 
State v.Finlavson. 2000 UT 10,16, 994 P.2d 1243. 
. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
A. UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. V 
B. UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 12 
2 
C. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-306. 
D. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-402(3). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 11,2006, Larry Yazzie Cly ("Cly") was charged by Information with Child 
Abuse, a second-degree felony; Aggravated Assault (Domestic Violence), a third-degree 
felony; and Commission of Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child, a third-degree 
felony. R001-R002. On July 20,2006, a trial was held in this matter before the Honorable 
Judge Lyle R. Anderson, in the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for San Juan County. 
R0119. 
At the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the parties and Judge Anderson 
convened outside the presence of the jury to discuss the jury instructions submitted. Tr. at 
pp. 154-161. Counsel herein specifically requested a voluntary intoxication instruction be 
presented to the jury, which request was denied by Judge Anderson on the basis that there 
was not enough evidence before the jury to raise the question. Id. at pp. 157-159. Counsel 
herein took an exception and it was noted by Judge Anderson. Id. 
At the conclusion of the trial when the jury had been excused to deliberate, counsel 
herein raised the issue of merger, requesting that the Child Abuse charge be merged with the 
Aggravated Assault or Domestic Violence charges. Tr. at pp. 188-189. The trial court 
determined that it had covered the issue by having the prosecution abandon its argument that 
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the Aggravated Assault occurred against the child, hence, the request to merge the charges 
was denied. Id. 
At the conclusion of the trial, Cly was convicted of Child Abuse, a third-degree 
felony; Aggravated Assault (Domestic Violence), a third-degree felony; and Domestic 
Violence in the Presence of a Child, a third-degree felony. R0112. On July 31,2006, the 
trial court entered the Judgment, as defined supra, and sentenced Cly to the Utah State Prison 
for a term not to exceed five years on each of the counts. R0113. The sentences were to be 
served concurrently. Id. On August 29,2006, Cly timely filed his Notice of Appeal from the 
Judgment. R0115. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 9, 2006, San Juan County Sheriffs deputies were called to a report of 
domestic violence at the Cly residence. Tr. at p. 69. Lahoma Cly ("Lahoma") testified that 
she and her husband Larry Cly ("Cly") had been arguing. Id. Lahoma testified that they 
were arguing because Cly had failed to pick up their son from school. Tr. at p. 69. Lahoma 
testified that Cly had been absent from the residence for a couple of days prior to the alleged 
incident, and that during the alleged incident Cly was drunk, his speech was slurred and he 
was staggering as he walked. Tr. at pp. 70,85-86. Lahoma testified tf lat, while speaking with 
Cly about her perception that he was not fulfilling his responsibilities with the children, she 
just "exploded." Id. Lahoma further testified that, after trying to discuss the problem with 
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Cly, she nicely told him that he needed to leave for a few days, so he went into their bedroom 
to pack his clothes. Tr. at pp. 71-72. 
Lahoma testified that, after Cly packed his clothes, she followed him to the kitchen. 
Tr. at p. 72. Lahoma testified that she was still nicely telling Cly to leave, since she thought 
all the children were asleep and did not want them to hear the arguing as she followed him 
to the kitchen. Id. Lahoma testified that she was standing behind the door in the kitchen 
telling Cly to leave when he grabbed a knife and started "poking9' the door with it. Tr. at p. 
75. She testified that when she saw the knife, she placed herself completely behind the door 
and pulled it against her. Id. She testified that she could see he was stabbing the door but 
she did not know how many times he had stabbed it. Tr. at p. 76. 
The couple's son, Fernando, testified that he saw Cly stabbing the door, heard him 
saying "you like that?" to Lahoma, and heard Lahoma crying. Tr. at p. 101. Fernando 
testified that he saw Lahoma behind the door and Cly stabbing the front of it, and heard Cly 
talking angry to Lahoma. Id. Lahoma testified that she told Fernando to go get help when 
Cly had the knife and she was by the door. Tr. at p. 76. 
Lahoma testified that, as Fernando was leaving, Cly yelled at him to come back, but 
she told Fernando to run and get help. Tr. at p. 77. Lahoma testified that she assumed that 
Cly threw the knife at Fernando, but she did not actually see Cly throw the knife at Fernando. 
Id. Lahoma testified that one moment Cly had the knife, and the next he did not. Id. 
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Lahoma testified that she then shut the door on Cly to get him out of the residence, 
but that he kept kicking the door and telling her to open the door. Tr. atp. 78. She testified 
that Cly left when she told him to leave, then she went next door to get Fernando from the 
neighbor's house. Id. Lahoma testified that she had no idea where Cly went at that time. 
Tr.atp. 81. 
The couple's son, Fernando, testified that he remembered the incident. Tr. at p. 100. 
Fernando testified that it was dark, that Cly was yelling at Lahoma and he could not stand it. 
Id. Fernando testified that Cly grabbed a kitchen knife "real fast," stabbed the door, and ran 
out. Tr. at pp. 100-101. Fernando testified that he then left and went to the neighbor's house. 
Tr. at p. 101. Fernando testified that when Cly ".. .gets kinda drunk when he drinks beer and 
that stuff, it happens. That's the first time. This is the first time." Id. 
Officer Brian Eschtruth ("Eschtruth") of the San Juan County Sheriffs Office was 
called to the Cly home around 11:30 p.m. on May 9, 2006, to investigate the incident. Tr. 
at p. 115. Eschtruth testified that, once he arrived on the scene he spoke both with Lahoma 
and Fernando. Id. Eschtruth testified that Lahoma told him that Cly came home drunk and 
had made her angry. Id. Eschtruth testified that Lahoma said she had told Cly to leave for 
a few days, and that Cly got angry with her and grabbed a knife while she was standing by 
the door. Id. Eschtruth testified that Lahoma reported to him that Cly pushed her behind the 
door and stabbed it. Tr. at pp. 115-116. Eschtruth testified that part of the door frame had 
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been broken from being kicked, and that he saw six or seven stab marks in the area of the 
doorhandle. Tr. at p. 116. 
Eschtruth testified that Fernando's testimony was different from what Fernando 
originally reported to him. Tr. at p. 117. Eschtruth testified at trial that Fernando originally 
told him he saw Cly stabbing the door and thought the knife had gone through and stabbed 
Lahoma and this scared him. Id. Fernando testified that he could not recall reporting this to 
Eschtruth. Tr. at p. 104. Eschtruth testified that Fernando reported to him that Lahoma 
yelled at him to go and get help and that, as he left, Cly threw the knife and it struck 
Fernando on the heel; however, Fernando reported he kept running and waited at the 
neighbors until help arrived. Tr. at p. 117. 
Fernando testified that Cly did not throw the knife at him and that he thought one of 
the sticks he stepped on flew up and hit his feet as he was going to the neighbor's house. Tr. 
atpp. 102,104. Additionally, Fernando testified that he lied in his initial statement about Cly 
throwing the knife at him because he wanted Cly to go to jail for acting violent and 
dangerous. Tr. at pp. 105-106. Eschtruth testified that he did not see any sticks or anything 
that could have hit Fernando's foot on the path Fernando would have taken to get help. Tr. 
at p. 124. 
Eschtruth testified that he had looked at Fernando's heel and saw a red mark that was 
consistent with a fresh bruise starting. Id. Eschtruth testified that there was initial swelling 
and a welt on the heel and that it was his opinion that this was a fresh injury to Fernando's 
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heel. Tr. at pp. 118-119. Lahoma also testified that she saw a little nip or bump on 
Fernando's foot. Tr. at p. 83. Fernando testified that there was no bruise on him. Tr. at p. 
102. 
Eschtruth testified that Lahoma and Fernando implicated Cly and that he then obtained 
a warrant for Cly's arrest. Tr. at p. 120. Eschtruth testified that Cly was subsequently picked 
up two (2) days later when he returned home. Tr. at p. 120-121. Eschtruth testified that he 
interrogated Cly regarding what happened on the night in question, and that Cly told him that 
he had come home drunk after drinking out at Red Mesa. Tr. at p. 121. Cly allegedly 
reported to Eschtruth that Lahoma made him mad, so he grabbed a knife and started stabbing 
the door to scare her. Tr. at pp. 121-122. He testified that Cly stated that he did not think 
he had thrown the knife at his son, but thought he had thrown it at the bushes until he saw 
the bruise and then "realized he hit his son with a knife." Id. at p. 122. Cly then allegedly 
admitted to Eschtruth that he had thrown the knife in the direction of his son, but also in the 
direction of a bush at which he was aiming. Tr. at p. 122. The knife was later found under 
the bumper of the car. Id. 
Eschtruth testified that Cly reported he was scared after the incident, so he went to the 
reservation and was going to turn himself in the next day. Id. Enschtruth testified that the 
knife hitting Fernando in the leg was a conclusion he came up with in his investigation based 
on the mark on this leg and the testimony of Lahoma and Fernando. Tr. at p. 126. 
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Ms. Cynthia Black ("Black") who is the Victim's Advocate for the San Juan County 
Sheriffs department, testified that she obtained the written statements of Fernando and 
Lahoma on May 10,2006, after being asked to do so by Eschtruth. Tr. at pp. 134-135. Black 
testified that Lahoma was in an emotionally calm state when she told her what happened. 
Id. She testified that she read it back to Lahoma before she signed it. Id. Black testified that 
she told Fernando and Lahoma to make sure that the statements they were giving were true, 
re-read the statements to them, and told them that by their signatures they would be 
indicating this was their testimony and that it was the truth. Tr. atpp. 135-136. Shetestified 
that both Fernando and Lahoma told her they were to nervous to write their statements and 
did not want to, so she asked them if they would like her to write the statements for them and 
they replied yes. Tr. at p. 137. 
Upon request by the prosecutor, Black read from the statement that she had taken from 
Fernando . Tr. at p. 139. She read that Fernando had stated in his initial statement that his 
Mom was behind the door and his dad was stabbing the door with a knife. Id. His statement 
indicated that his Mom told him to get help. Id. Fernando's statement said that he headed 
down the stairs to do so and his Dad told him not to. Id. Fernando then felt the knife hit his 
foot close to his ankle and he started to run and cry, according to the statement prepared by 
Black. Id 
Two (2) days later, Officer Jared Hillhouse ("Hillhouse") of the San Juan County 
Sheriffs Department, assisted Eschtruth in execution of a warrant for Cly's arrest over the 
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alleged incident. Tr. at p. 129. After reading him his rights, HilJhouse and Eschtrath 
questioned Cly about what had happened. Id. Cly informed them that he had been in Red 
Mesa with his friends, drinking, and that they had three 18-packs between them. Id. Cly 
allegedly stated that he came home, got into an argument with his wife, and that "for some 
reason he found himself pickin5 up a knife and trying to get at her." Id. 
On July 20,2006, a trial was held in this matter before the Honorable Judge Lyle R. 
Anderson, in the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for San Juan County. R0119. At the 
conclusion of the trial, Cly was convicted of Child Abuse, a third-degree felony; Aggravated 
Assault (Domestic Violence), a third-degree felony; and Domestic Violence in the Presence 
of a Child, a third-degree felony. R0112. On July 31, 2006, the trial court entered the 
Judgment and sentenced Cly to the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed five years on 
each of the counts. R0113. The sentences were to be served concurrently. Id. Cly timely 
appealed from the Judgment. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
"[C]riminal convictions may not be based upon conjectures or probabilities and before 
we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each 
element of the crime as charged from which the jury may base its conclusion of guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt." Spanish Fork Citv v. Brvan. 1999 UT App 61.110. 975P.2d501;^e 
also State v.George. 25 Utah 2d 330,481 P.2d 667,667 (1971) (reversing conviction where 
circumstantial evidence required jury "to indulge an inference upon an inference that could 
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lead but to conjecture"). The evidence in this matter was insufficient to support the 
conviction of child abuse. As argued further below, the evidence to support the conviction 
for child abuse was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the 
verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust. See. State v. Lopez. 2001 UTApp 123,T[10,24 P.3d 
993. 
"Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge unless such 
intoxication negates the existence of the mental state which is an element of the offense; 
however, if recklessness or criminal negligence establishes an element of an offense and the 
actor is unaware of the risk because of voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial 
in a prosecution for that offense." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-306. As testified to by both key 
witnesses presented by the prosecution at trial, Appellant was highly intoxicated at the time 
he committed the aggravated assault and therefore, was entitled to a jury instruction 
regarding voluntary intoxication. 
As this Court observed, in its origin, "'[m]erger is a judicially-crafted doctrine 
available to protect criminal defendants from being twice punished for committing a single 
act that may violate more than one criminal statute.'" State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, % 7,122 
P.3d 615, citine State v. Smith. 2003 UT App 52, f 19, 65 P.3d 648 (quoting State v. Diaz. 
2002 UT App 288, f 17, 55 P.3d 1131). After careful review of the evidence presented as 
it pertains to the Child Abuse charge, it is clear that the charges in this matter of Domestic 
Violence in the Presence of a Child and Child Abuse contain the same elements and stem 
11 
from the same actions in the alleged incident. Therefore, the Child Abuse charge should 
have been merged with the Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child charge and, having 
not done so, Cly was inappropriately punished twice for allegedly committing a single act in 
this matter. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION 
ON THE CHARGE OF THIRD DEGREE FELONY CHILD ABUSE. 
The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence "is highly 
deferential to a jury verdict." State v. Workman. 2005 UT 66,129, 122 P.3d 639. "[This 
Court] begin[s] by reviewing 'the evidence and all inferences which may be reasonably 
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict."5 Id. (citations omitted). "[This 
Court] will reverse a jury verdict for insufficient evidence only if [it] determinefs] that 
'reasonable minds couldnothave reached the verdict.'"/*/, (citations omitted). Stated another 
way, "[this Court] will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing the evidence and all 
inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, [it] find[s] that the 
evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing 
as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. Lopez, 2001 UT App 123,f 
10,24P.3d993. 
To challenge a court's factual findings, "'an appellant must first marshal all the 
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most favorable to the court 
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below. "'Chen v. Stewart 2004 UT 82, f76, 100 P.3d 1177, (Utah 2004), citing Wilson 
Supply v. Fradan Mfg. Corp. 2002 UT 94 at ^  21, 54 P.3d 1177. "[C]riminal convictions 
may not be based upon conjectures or probabilities and before we can uphold a conviction 
it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as 
charged from which the jury may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Spanish Fork Citv v. Bryan. 1999UTApp61,^flO, 975 P.2d 501: see also State v. George. 
481 P.2d 667 (Utah 1971) (reversing conviction where circumstantial evidence required jury 
'to indulge an inference upon an inference that could lead but to conjecture"). 
Several witnesses offered testimony as to the charge of Child Abuse in this matter, 
which stemmed from allegations that Cly threw a knife at Fernando and hit him in the heel 
as he was heading towards the neighbor's house. It is important to note that none of the 
witnesses ever saw the incident occur, including the alleged victim. It is also important to 
note that the alleged victim recanted his assumption during his testimony, providing a 
plausible explanation for why he originally stated the incident occurred. The evidence is best 
analyzed in this respect, however, through the marshaling as follows. 
A. Fernando's Testimony. 
The Child Abuse charge in this matter finds its basis in the initial statement of 
Fernando, which was taken and written by Black-a victim advocate-the day after the alleged 
incident occurred. In his initial statement, Fernando indicated that Cly had thrown the knife 
at him and it had hit him in the heel. Tr. at p. 139. However, when Fernando testified at 
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trial, he indicated that he had lied in his statement about the knife being thrown at him. Tr. 
at p. 102. Fernando testified that, as he ran away to get help, he looked over his shoulder and 
saw that Cly still had the knife in his hand and was kicking and hitting the door. Tr. at p. 
113. 
Fernando testified that Cly did not throw the knife at him and that he thought one of 
the sticks he stepped on flew up and hit his feet as he was going to the neighbor's house. Tr. 
at pp. 102, 104. Fernando also testified that he did not feel anything hit his foot as he ran 
away to get help, but that it could have been a rock or a stick that hit his heel. Tr. at p. 111. 
Fernando testified that there was no bruise on him. Tr. at p. 102. He also testified that he had 
shown the officers a bruise on his foot and told them that the bruise was from something that 
happened between him and his little brother. Tr. at p. 112. He has previously told the 
officers it was from Cly throwing something at him, but he testified at trial that he lied. Tr. 
at p. 112. 
The prosecutor questioned Fernando as to why he would give false statements to the 
officers. Tr. at p. 105. Fernando explained that he had lied in his initial statement about Cly 
throwing the knife at him because he wanted Cly to go to jail for acting violent and 
dangerous by stabbing the door with the knife. Tr. at pp. 105-106. 
B. Lahoma's Testimony. 
From Lahoma's perspective of the alleged incident, she testified that she sent 
Fernando to call the police during the argument with Cly. Tr. at p. 76. She testified that, 
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when Fernando left to get help, Cly yelled at Fernando to come back, but that she told 
Fernando to run and get help. Tr.atp. 77. She testified that she "guessed" that Cly had then 
thrown the knife at Fernando, but that she did not actually see it happen. Tr. at p. 77. 
Lahoma testified that she only knew that she saw Cly with the knife and then later it was 
found underneath the car. Id. 
When questioned by the prosecutor, Lahoma testified twice that she did not see any 
bruises on Femando's foot or leg. Tr. at p. 83. Lahoma then remembered that she saw on 
Fernando a "little teeny nip" or "just like a nick," like "when you bump into something." Tr. 
at p. 83. 
C. Eschtruth's Testimony. 
Eschtruth testified that he investigated the incident. Tr. at p. 115. Eschtruth testified 
that Fernando's testimony at trial was very different from his original report to him. Tr. at 
p. 117. He testified that Fernando originally reported as follows: 
Ah, he said that he came runnin' from the door. He saw his dad stabbin' at the 
door. He actually thought that, ah, the knife actually went through the door 
and stabbed his mom, and that's what scared him. His mom yelled at him to 
got get help. As he fled, that his dad threw a knife at him, strikin' him in the 
heel. And he continued to run and then waited over there at the neighbor's 
house until we arrived. 
Tr. at p. 117. Eschtruth testified that he had looked at Femando's heel and saw a red mark 
that was consistent with a fresh bruise starting. Tr. at p. 117. He testified that there was 
initial swelling and a welt on the heel. Tr. at p. 118. He testified it was his opinion that this 
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was a fresh injury to Fernando's heel and that Fernando told him that Cly had thrown the 
knife at him. Tr. at p. 119. 
Eschtruth later testified that he did not see any sticks or anything that could have 
"come up and hit him there." Tr. at p. 124. Eschtruth's report also indicated that the knife 
struck Fernando in the leg rather than the heel. Tr. at p. 126. Eschtruth testified that the 
knife hitting Fernando in the foot was a conclusion he came up with in his investigation 
based on the mark on Femando's foot and the reports from Lahoma and Fernando. Tr. at p. 
126. 
Eschtruth testified that when Cly was subsequently picked up two (2) days later, that 
he questioned Cly about what happened on the night of the incident. Tr. at p. 121. In his line 
of questioning, Eschtruth testified that Cly stated he did not think he had thrown the knife 
at his son, but that he thought he had thrown it in the bushes to get rid of it. Tr. at pp. 122, 
125, Eschtruth testified that, when Cly saw the bruise, "he realized he hit his son with a 
knife." Id. Eschtruth testified that Cly admitted to him that he may have hit Fernando with 
the knife. Id. However, on cross-examination, Eschtruth indicated that he had not reported 
either that Cly had seen the bruise or anything respecting Cly's admission because he "didn't 
think it was pertinent to [his] report, at that point." Tr. at p. 126. Eschtruth indicated that the 
knife was located after the alleged incident under the front bumper of the car. Tr. at p. 123. 
D. Hillhouse's Testimony. 
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Officer Jared Hillhouse of the San Juan County Sheriffs Department testified that 
he assisted Officer Eschtruth with the arrest of Appellant. Id. He testified that, at the time 
of his arrest, Cly stated that he threw the knife and was not sure where it went. Id. Hillhouse 
testified that he did not recall anything being said about either Cly seeing the bruises on 
Fernando's ankle or his realizing the knife could have hit Fernando. Tr. at p. 131. 
E. Black's Testimony. 
Ms. Cynthia Black testified that she is a victim advocate and works for the San Juan 
County Sheriffs Department. Tr. at p. 134. She testified her position is to assist female 
victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking. Id. She testified she saw Lahoma 
the day after the incident on May 10,2006, at her home. Id. She testified that she wrote both 
Lahoma and Fernando's statements. Id. She read part of Fernando's initial statement, as 
follows: 
Mom was here and dad was stabbing the door with a knife. Mom said, 'Go get 
help.' She was crying. I walked down the stairs and dad said, 'Don't do that.' 
Dad threw a knife at me. I felt the knife hit my foot close to the ankle. I 
started to run and cry. 
Tr. at p. 139. Black testified that taking statements is not normally her duty as a victim 
advocate. Tr. at p. 142. 
F. The Evidence is Insufficient to Meet the Elements of Child Abuse. 
"No person accused in the United States may be convicted of a crime unless each 
element of the offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Reves. 2005 
UT 33, fl 1,116 P.3d 305, citing In re Winship. 397 U.S. 358,90 S.Ct. 1068,25 L.Ed. 368 
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(U.S.N. Y. 1970). "The Supreme Court has assigned this standard of proof constitutional 
status, linking it to both the Fifth Amendment right to due process of law and the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial." Id, citing: Sullivan v. Louisiana. 508 U.S. 275,278,113 
S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993); Winship. 397 U.S. at 362, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068. This 
Court has previously stated as follows: 
The right to require the State to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is 
guaranteed by the due process clauses of the Utah and the United States 
Constitutions. See State v. Lopes. 1999UT24,! 13,980P.2d 191 (holding that 
"as both a state and federal constitutional matter, we conclude that due process 
requires that the prosecution prove every element of the charged crimes 
beyond a reasonable doubt (citing UTAH CONST, ART. I, §7 which reads: No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law 
and U.S. CONST, AMENDS. V, XIV)." 
State v. Mora. 2003 UT App 117, f22, 69 P.3d 838 (additional citations omitted). 
Cly was convicted of reckless child abuse, a third-degree felony. Under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-5-109(2)(b), the elements of reckless child abuse are as follows: 
Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having the 
care or custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious 
physical injury upon a child is guilty of an offense as follows: (b) if done 
recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree. 
Under subsection (1) of the same code section, "serious physical injury" is defined, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
(d) (i) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set of injuries that: 
(A) seriously impairs the child's health; 
(B) involves physical torture; 
(C) causes serious emotional harm to the child; or 
(D) involves a substantial risk of death to the child, 
(ii) "Serious physical injury" includes: 
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(D) any injury caused by use of a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(1). 
As this Court has previously indicated, "criminal convictions may not be based upon 
conjectures or probabilities and before we can uphold a conviction it must be supported by 
a quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as charged from which the jury 
may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Spanish Fork Citv v. Brvan. 
1999 UT App 61,110, 975 P.2d 501; see also State v. George, 481 P.2d 667 (Utah 1971) 
(reversing conviction where circumstantial evidence required jury "to indulge an inference 
upon an inference that could lead but to conjecture"). 
For child abuse to have occurred, evidence must show that Cly inflicted "serious 
physical injury" upon Fernando. First and foremost, there is no evidence that Cly actually 
threw the knife at Fernando. Lahoma did not see it happen, but just "guessed" that it had, 
presumably from what Fernando reported. Eschtruth also reported his investigative findings 
based upon the "guess" from Lahoma and Fernando's report. Fernando, however, testified 
that it he lied about it happening and gave plausible explanations for why he would fabricate 
the story1. Fernando wanted Cly to go to jail, so Fernando lied and said that Cly threw the 
knife at him to ensure that Cly would go to jail. Fernando testified that, as he ran away to 
1
 Even the prosecutor himself was surprised by Fernando's testimony, attempting 
to call Black as a "rebuttal" witness to his own witness, although she had remained in the 
courtroom in violation of the exclusionary rule. Tr. at p. 132. 
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get help, he looked over his shoulder and saw that Cly still had the knife in his hand and was 
kicking and hitting the door. Tr. at p. 113. 
Fernando also testified that he had no bruises and Lahoma offered the same testimony 
until emphasized by the prosecution, to which she then said she saw a "little teeny nip" on 
Fernando. Eschtruth testified that he saw a "red mark" and a "welt" with "swelling" on 
Fernando's heel; however, his report clearly says that he believed at the time of the incident 
that it was on Fernando's leg. The idea that it was on Fernando's leg is again emphasized 
by Eschtruth testifying that he did not see how a stick or rock could "come up and hit him 
there." Fernando's initial recanted statement said that it was his heel as well. Regardless, 
Fernando clarified that any mark or bruise he may have shown the officers was a product of 
something that had happened earlier with his brother. 
The only evidence offered was recanted by the person initially reporting it. Fernando 
gave a plausible reason why he fabricated the story and why he may have had a mark on him 
that day, which it is questionable whether he did or not. Eschtruth and Black's testimonies 
respecting the matter were based completely upon Fernando's initial recanted report. Cly has 
the right to have his conviction based upon a quantum of evidence concerning each element 
of the alleged crime, and not upon conjectures, probabilities or "guessing" as was the case 
here. There was nothing presented at trial in this matter to evidence that (a) the knife was 
thrown, (b) by Cly, (c) towards Fernando, (d) striking him in the heel, all which go to the 
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element of infliction of "serious physical injury" of that charge upon which Cly was 
convicted* No evidence supports that Cly inflicted "serious physical injury" upon Fernando. 
More specifically, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(l)(d)(i)(A), no evidence was 
presented to indicate that Cly undertook any action that seriously impaired Fernando's health. 
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(l)(d)(i)(B), no evidence was presented that Fernando 
was subjected to physical torture. Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(l)(d)(i)(C), no 
evidence was presented that Fernando was caused any serious emotional harm, particularly 
in light of the fact that he recanted the testimony offered2. 
The only definition that encompasses the testimony elicited at trial in this matter 
pertains to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(l)(d)(ii)(D) where it says that "'[s]erious physical 
injury' includes:... any injury caused by use of a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-
601," which section includes a definition of a "dangerous weapon" as ".. .any item capable 
of causing death or serious bodily injury;..." UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1 -601 (5)(a). Since a knife 
could clearly be considered under the definition of "a dangerous weapon" under this section, 
the challenge then merits the question of whether a "little teeny nip" or a "red mark" are 
considered "any injury." Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(2)(b), the code section 
containing the charge for which Cly was convicted, it lists "serious physical injury" as the 
element that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. However, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
2
 Cly hereby incorporates the argument set forth under Argument IK herein as to the 
challenge that any evidence outside of the allegations addressed herein pertaining to the element 
of child abuse under the domestic violence charge should be merged with the child abuse charge. 
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109(l)(c)(i) clearly defines only "physical injury" as a "bruise or other contusion of the skin," 
which is listed as an element in lesser misdemeanor charges of child abuse as found under 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(3)(a) through (c). Thus, it is axiomatic by the plain language 
of the statutes that UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(2)(b) did not intend "serious physical 
injury" to include any and all injuries since the legislature clearly set forth specific minor 
injuries such as a bruise, contusion, minor laceration or abrasion or any other circumstance 
not rising to "serious physical injury" to be included as a separate and distinct element 
defined as "physical injury" and amounting only to the lesser misdemeanor charges. UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(l)(c) and (3). As indicated, the element of "serious physical injury" 
contained in the language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(2)(b) could not be proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt absent sufficient evidence towards that end, and no such evidence was 
offered. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-2-103 states, in pertinent part, as follows: 
A person engages in conduct: . . .(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware 
of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and 
degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that 
an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint. 
As to the reckless element of the third degree felony charge, Eschtruth testified that Cly told 
him that he had thrown the knife in the bushes. The knife was later found under the bumper 
of the car. It was never established by the prosecution and no evidence was presented as to 
where the bushes were in relation to the car or the bumper of the car, nor how the path 
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Fernando took towards the neighbor's house fell in relation to these items of import. No one 
testified that they even saw the knife thrown anywhere. Insufficient evidence exists for Cly 
to have been convicted of reckless child abuse when no evidence exists as to show whether 
or when or where the knife was actually thrown, particularly in relation to Fernando. 
Fernando testified that Cly did not throw the knife at him and that when he went to get help 
he looked over his shoulder and Appellant still had the knife in his hand. Tr. at p. 113. 
Additionally, no timeline was ever established and no evidence was presented as to 
when the knife was allegedly thrown, whether it was before, during, or after the time 
Fernando left the residence. Without a timeline or someone actually seeing the knife thrown, 
there is no nexus between Cly allegedly saying he threw the knife and it possibly hitting 
Fernando, because it could have happened before or after Fernando left. Because this cannot 
be established there is insufficient evidence to show that Cly acted "recklessly." The 
recklessness element of the Child Abuse conviction had not been met. 
In order for the conviction of Child Abuse to hold there must be sufficient evidence 
that would lead the jury to convict Appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. In this matter, the 
jury indulged in an inference that the path Fernando was on was near the bushes Cly said he 
threw the knife in and near the car under which the knife was later found. That inference led 
them to indulge in the further inference that Fernando acted recklessly by throwing the knife 
in the same direction as Fernando. The jury then took the circumstantial evidence they had 
based their inferences upon and determined that Cly was guilty of a third degree felony child 
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abuse because he acted recklessly in throwing the knife in the direction of Fernando; 
however, the evidence does not support this scenario and the circumstantial evidence 
presented lacks the necessary nexus to lead to a viable conclusion rather than conjecture. 
State v. George. 481 P.2d 667 (Utah 1971). 
UTAH CONST, ART. I, §7 and U.S. CONST, AMENDS. V and XIV dictate that a lack of 
sufficiency of the evidence cannot support a finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
"[T]he evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and 
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." State v. Lopez. 2001 
UT App 123,H 10, 24 P.3d 993. Cly is entitled to reversal of the conviction on the third 
degree felony Child Abuse based upon lack of sufficient evidence supporting such a charge 
and conviction. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING A JURY INSTRUCTION 
WITH REFERENCE TO APPELLANT'S INVOLUNTARY 
INTOXICATION AND THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULT CHARGE. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-306 states as follows: 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense to a criminal charge unless such 
intoxication negates the existence of the mental state which is an element of 
the offense; however, if recklessness or criminal negligence establishes an 
element of an offense and the actor is unaware of the risk because of voluntary 
intoxication, his unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution for that offense." 
In State v. Stenback. the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows: 
In 16 C. J. 107 the law is thus stated: "The rule that drunkenness is no defense 
does not apply to the full extent where a specific intent or motive is an 
essential element of the offense charged. If at the time of the commission of 
such an offense the accused was by intoxication so entirely deprived of his 
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reason that he did not have the mental capacity to entertain the necessary 
specific intent which is required to constitute the crime, he must necessarily be 
acquitted; and in like manner the fact of defendant's drunkenness should be 
considered in determining the degree of the crime. This is so, not because 
drunkenness excuses crime but because if the mental status required by law to 
constitute crime be one of specific intent or of deliberation and premeditation, 
and drunkenness excludes the existence of such mental state, then the 
particular crime charged has not in fact been committed. 
Ibid, 78 Utah 350,2 P.2d 1050,1054, (Utah 1931). Our 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has 
stated that, "[t]o merit an intoxication jury instruction, the evidence presented at trial must 
establish mental impairment due to voluntary intoxication sufficient to negate the existence 
of specific intent.5' U.S. v. Chee, 44 Fed.Appx. 289, 291 (10th Cir. (N.M.) 2002), citing 
United States v. Bovles. 57 F.3d 535, 542 (7th Cir. 1995). It further stated that, "[m]ere 
evidence-of drinking or intoxication is not adequate because it is not evidence of mental 
impairment." Id. 
"Whether a trial court improperly denied a requested jury instruction is a question of 
law that an appellate court reviews for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court 
conclusions." State v. Harper. 2006 UT App 178,136 P.3d 1261. "Trial court has duty to 
instruct jury on law applicable to facts of case such that defendant's theory of case is 
presented to jury in clear and understandable way; however, trial court may refuse to give 
instruction that misstates law and it is not error to refuse proposed instruction if point is 
properly covered in other instructions." State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232 (Utah,1992). 
In the instant matter, Cly was voluntarily intoxicated at the time the alleged 
aggravated assault was committed. Lahoma testified that, on the night of the argument, Cly 
25 
had come home after disappearing for a couple of days and that he was drunker than she had 
ever seen him. Tr. at p. 86. Lahoma testified that she first told Cly that she could not talk 
to him because he was so drunk and kept getting angry and trying to start an argument with 
her. Tr. at p. 71. Lahoma testified that Cly was staggering and stuttering because he had 
drank to much and that she felt like it would be dangerous to ride in a motor vehicle with him 
because she did not feel he could operate a motor vehicle. Tr. at p. 85. Lahoma stated that 
Cly did not have control over his body or his speech. Tr. at p. 86. Cly informed Eschtruth 
and Hillhouse that prior to the incident he had been in Red Mesa with his friends drinking, 
and that they had three 18-packs between them. Tr. at p. 129. Cly allegedly stated that he 
came home, got into an argument with his wife, and that "for some reason he found himself 
pickin' up a knife and trying to get at her." Id Fernando testified that Cly "knows what's 
the right thing, but when he gets kinda drunk when he drinks beer and that stuff, it happens." 
Tr.atp. 101. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-103 states that: 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section 
76-5-102 and he: intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or (b) 
under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), uses a 
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.(2) A violation of Subsection 
(l)(a) is a second degree felony. (3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third 
degree felony. 
Sufficient evidence exists to show that Appellant was voluntarily intoxicated at the 
time of he committed the Aggravated Assault. Cly's intoxicated state negated his mental 
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state with regards to the aggravated assault. Officer Hillhouse testified during trial that upon 
his arrest Appellant told him that for some reason he found himself picking up a knife and 
trying to get at his wife, although he did not know why. Tr. at p. 130. Cly was so intoxicated 
that he was stuttering when he talked and he was staggering as he walked. This deep level 
of intoxication caused Appellant to not realize why he grabbed the knife, why he was trying 
to assault his wife, or what the consequences and risk of such actions could be. He was not 
aware of what he was doing. Because his intoxicated state caused him to be unaware of what 
he was doing or the possible consequences that could occur because of this, a jury instruction 
regarding the voluntary intoxication should have been included in the jury instructions. 
Appellant did not have the mental state that would be necessary to form the intent that is an 
element of the offense nor did he realize what the risk or consequences of his actions could 
be. 
The evidence presented at trial is enough to establish intoxication. The fact that 
Appellant was stuttering and staggering during the argument with his wife and the fact that 
she would not feel safe with him in a motor vehicle is enough evidence to show that he was 
intoxicated to the point of having his mental state negated and did not knowing what he was 
doing. In many instances police officers have stopped people for DUTs based on evidence 
such as having "glassy, bloodshot eyes" and "slightly swaying," American Fork Citv v. 
Singleton, 2004 UT App 17211,2004 WL 1368211, (Utah App.,2004). The evidence of 
stuttering speech and staggering movement is evidence enough that Appellant was 
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intoxicated during the incident. Because of his deep state of intoxication Appellant could not 
have any knowledge of what he was doing and without the knowledge of what he was doing 
could not have any knowledge of what the consequences could be. 
Appellant exhibited signs of being significantly drunk at the time of the aggravated 
assault. The signs he exhibited would have been enough to have been stopped by police 
officers for being intoxicated without doing any further investigation. Because of this 
mental state he did not have the mental capacity to realize what he was doing and without 
this mental state and capacity, he could not have committed the crime of aggravated assault. 
Based on the fact that Appellant was voluntarily intoxicated at the time he committed the 
aggravated assault. The trial court erred in not giving the jury an instruction regarding 
involuntary intoxication. 
m. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MERGE THE CHARGES 
OF CHILD ABUSE AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF 
A CHILD 
As this Court observed, in its origin,,f f [m]erger is a judicially-crafted doctrine 
available to protect criminal defendants from being twice punished for 
committing a single act that may violate more than one criminal statute.'" State 
v. Smith. 2005 UT 57, f 7,122 P.3d 615, citing State v. Smith. 2003 UT App 
52, f 19,65 P.3d 648 (quoting State v. Diaz. 2002 UT App 288, f 17,55 P.3d 
1131). The motivating principle behind the merger doctrine is to prevent 
violations of constitutional double jeopardy protection. Id. citing State v. 
Lopez. 2004 UT App 410, \ 8, 103 P.3d 153 ("Courts apply the merger 
doctrine as one means of alleviating the concern of double jeopardy that a 
defendant should not be punished twice for the same crime."); see also Brown 
v. Ohio. 432 U.S. 161, 169, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977) ("[T]he 
[Double Jeopardy Clause] forbids successive prosecution and cumulative 
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punishment for a greater and lesser included offense."). Codifying this 
doctrine, UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-402(3) sets forth as follows: 
defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged but 
may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An 
offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to 
commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
See also, State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70, 90 (Utah 1993) (recognizing that the test for 
determining whether a conviction for two separate offenses violates the Double Jeopardy 
Clause is essentially the same as that in UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1 -402(3)); State v. McCovev, 
803 P.2d 1234,1235 (Utah 1990)(recognizing that convictions for both a greater and a lesser 
included offense would violate both the Double Jeopardy Clause and UTAH CODE ANN. §76-
1-402(3)). "[W]here the two crimes are 'such that the greater cannot be committed without 
necessarily having committed the lesser,1 then as a matter of law they stand in the relationship 
of greater and lesser offenses, and the defendant cannot be convicted or punished for both.9' 
Smith at 18 citing State v. Hill. 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. Baker. 671 
P.2d 152,156 (Utah 1983)). 
In Hill, the Utah Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for determining whether a 
conviction for a second offense arising out of the same set of facts violates UTAH CODE ANN. 
§76-1-402(3), requiring a comparison of "the statutory elements of the two crimes [first] as 
a theoretical matter and [second], where necessary, by reference to the facts proved at trial." 
HiU at 97. The pertinent statutory elements of Child Abuse are as follows: 
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(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having 
the care or custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious 
physical injury upon a child is guilty of an offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the second degree; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misdemeanor. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(2)(b). The statutory elements of Commission of Domestic 
Violence in the Presence of a Child are as follows: 
(2) A person is guilty of child abuse if the person: 
(a) commits or attempts to commit criminal homicide, as defined in Section 
76-5-201, against a cohabitant in the presence of a child; or 
(b) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to a cohabitant or uses a 
dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 76-1-601, or other means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury against a cohabitant, in the 
presence of a child; or 
(c) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (2)(a) or 
(b), commits an act of domestic violence in the presence of a child. 
UTAHCODEANN. §76-5-109.1(2). It is clear that the Domestic Violence in the Presence of 
a Child charge is a lesser-included offense of the Child Abuse charge in that Child Abuse 
itself is the first requirement for Domestic Violence in the Presence of a Child. This means 
that the Child Abuse charge had already been addressed when the charge of Domestic 
Violence in the Presence of a Child was made and Appellant should not have been charged 
with both. Because Child Abuse is an element of Domestic Violence in the Presence of 
Child it is lesser-included offense of Child Abuse and the two offense should have been 
merged. Compare, UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-109(2)(b) with UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-
109.1(2). The first prong of the Hill test is obviously met here. 
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As compared to the facts proven at trial in this matter, the second prong of the Hill test 
is also met. M l at 97. The facts m set forth under the section entitled "Statement of Facts" 
and Argument I in this matter, show that if any act of child abuse was committed in this 
matter, it would have to pertain to the same act utilized in the charge of domestic violence. 
As argued supra, independent of the actions undertaken which pertain to the domestic 
violence charge, there is insufficient evidence to establish the child abuse charge. The child 
abuse charge should have been merged with the domestic violence charge since no evidence 
exists to actually show that any "serious physical injury1' occurred to rise to the third degree 
felony child abuse charge independent of the domestic violence charge. 
Absent the trial court's recognition that these charges should be merged. Appellant's 
convictions for both violated both the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Utah and United States 
Constitutions and UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-402(3). UNITED STATES CONST, AMEND. V; 
UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 12; McCovev at 1235, 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore^ based upon the foregoing, Cly respectfully requests lhat this Couit 
overturn the Judgment and enter any ULUCT buck urdeis as this Court deems appropriate. 
DATED this 2°/ <^day of November, 2006. 
WilJiam L. Schultz J 
Attorney for Larry Cly 
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As compared to the facts proven at trial in this matter, the second prong of the Hill test 
is also met. HU1 at 97. The facts as set forth under the section entitled "Statement of Facts" 
and Argument I in this matter, show that if any act of child abuse was committed in this 
matter, it would have to pertain to the same act utilized in the charge of domestic violence. 
As argued supra, independent of the actions undertaken which pertain to the domestic 
violence charge, there is insufficient evidence to establish the child abuse charge. The child 
abuse charge should have been merged with the domestic violence charge since no evidence 
exists to actually show that any "serious physical injury" occurred to rise to the third degree 
felony child abuse charge independent of the domestic violence charge. 
Absent the trial court's recognition that these charges should be merged, Appellant's 
convictions for both violated both the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Utah and United States 
Constitutions and UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-402(3). UNITED STATES CONST. AMEND. V; 
UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 12; McCovev at 1235. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, Cly respectfully requests that this Court 
overturn the Judgment and enter any other such orders as this Court deems appropriate. 
DATED this day of November, 2006. 
William L.Schultz 
Attorney for Larry Cly 
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prepaid, true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to: 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
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Addendum ~A~ 
Judgment and Order of Commitment to 
Utah State Prison, 
dated July 31,2006 
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San Juan County 
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CLERK OF THE COURT 
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IN AND FOR SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






JUDGEMENT AND ORDER 
OF COMMITMENT TO 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
Case No. 0617-58 
JULY 31,2006 
HONORABLE LYLE R. ANDERSON 
Plaintiff Attorney: Craig C. Halls 
Defendant Attorney: William L. Schultz 
This being the day and hour fixed for pronouncing judgment in this case, and the 
defendant being present in Court and represented by counsel, and defendant having heretofore 
been adjudged guilty of the offenses of: 
COUNT 1: CHILD ABUSE, a Third Degree Felony, COUNT 2: AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
(DOMESTIC VIOLENCE), a Third Degree Felony, and COUNT 3: COMMISSION OF 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN THE PRESENCE OF A CHILD, a Third Degree Felony, and no 
legal reason having been shown why judgment of this Court should not be pronounced, it is the 
judgment of this Court as follows: 
That the defendant, LARRY YAZZIE CLY, be imprisoned in the Utah State Prison for a 
term NOT TO EXCEED FIVE (5) YEARS on each Count, to be served concurrently. 
Defendant is hereby remanded to the custody of the San Juan County Sheriff or other 
proper officer to be transported to the Utah State Prison. 
DATED this 31*7/ day of J(/lh , 2006. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3( day of T U t ^ p 2006,1 mailed, 
postage prepaid, or hand delivered a true copy of the foregoing JUDGEMENT AND ORDER 
OF COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE PRISON to William L. Schultz, Attorney for the 
defendant at PO Box 937, Moab, UT 84532; Adult Probation and Parole at 217 E. Main, Suite 
140, Moab, UT 84532; and to the Department of Corrections, PO Box 250, Draper, UT 84020. 
Clerk 
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Briefs and Other Related Documents 
U.S. v. CheeC.A.10 (N.M.)^002.This case was not 
selected for publication in the Federal 
Reporter.Please use FIND to look at the applicable 
circuit court rule before citing this opinion. Tenth 
Circuit Rule 36.3. (FIND CTA10 Rule 36.3.) 
United States Court of Appeals,Tenth Circuit. 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Kenneth CHEE, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 01-2002. 
April 10,2002. 
Following affirmance of his convictions on direct 
appeal, federal prisoner moved to vacate or set 
aside. The United States District Court for the 
District of New Mexico denied motions. Certificate 
of appealability (COA) was granted as to one issue, 
and movant appealed seeking COAs with respect to 
remaining issues. The Court of Appeals held that: 
(1) insufficiency of evidence to support jury 
instruction on voluntary intoxication precluded 
claim of ineffective assistance based on failure to 
request instruction; and (2) movant did not make 
requisite showing to support issuance of COA on 
remaining issues, which were addressed and 
rejected on direct appeal. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law 110 €=>1440(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXX Post-Conviction Relief 
110XXX(A) In General 
110kl435 Consideration Despite Waiver 
or Other Bar 
110kl440 Counsel 
110kl440(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
On motion to vacate or set aside, procedural bar did 
not apply to ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
Page 1 
on basis of movant's failure to raise underlying 
claim that juiy instructions were inadequate on 
direct appeal. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255. 
[2] Criminal Law 110 €=>774 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
110XX(G) Instructions: Necessity, 
Requisites, and Sufficiency 
110k774 k. Intoxication. Most Cited Cases 
Evidence presented at trial on maiming charge, that 
defendant was frequently drunk, that defendant 
frequently began arguing with and "punch[ing]" 
victim when he became drunk, and that he was 
intoxicated at time of crime, did not tend to show 
that intoxication impaired defendant to degree 
necessary to negate specific intent to maim, and 
thus would not have supported voluntary 
intoxication instruction. 
[3] Criminal Law 110 €=1073 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(F) Proceedings, Generally 
110kl073 k. Certificate of Probable Cause 
or Reasonable Doubt. Most Cited Cases 
Movant was not entitled to certificate of 
appealability (COA) on claims that trial court erred 
in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal, 
where sufficient evidence to support convictions 
was found on direct appeal, precluding a substantial 
showing of the denial of a constitutional right, 
absent an intervening change in law. 28 U.S.C.A. § 
2255. 
[4] Criminal Law 110 C=»1073 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
110XXIV(F) Proceedings, Generally 
110kl073 k. Certificate of Probable Cause 
or Reasonable Doubt. Most Cited Cases 
to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
rage 5 or D 
44 Fed.Appx. 289 
44 FeAAppx. 289,2002 WL 532422 (C.A.10 (N.M.)) 
(Cite as: 44 Fed.Appx. 289) 
Movant was not entitled to certificate of 
appealability (COA) on collateral review on 
propriety of six-level upward departure at 
sentencing, where issue had been addressed on 
direct appeal and rejected and movant did not show 
intervening change in law. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255. 
[5] Criminal Law 110 €=*1433(1) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXX Post-Conviction Relief 
110XXX(A) In General 
110kl433 Matters Already Adjudicated 
110kl433(l) k. In General Most Cited 
Cases 
Defendant's stipulation at trial that alleged assault 
took place within Indian country barred his claim on 
motion to vacate or set aside that there was 
insufficient evidence to establish that crime 
occurred in Indian country. 
[6] Indictment and Information 210 €=»176 
210 Indictment and Information 
210X11 Issues, Proof, and Variance 
210kl70 Variance Between Allegations and 
Proof 
210kl76 k. Time of Offense. Most Cited 
Cases 
Alleged discrepancy between indictment and 
evidence presented at trial as to time of crime did 
not deprive court of subject matter jurisdiction, 
where time was not element of offense and facts 
charged in indictment showed that offense fell 
within the relevant statute of limitations. 
[7] Criminal Law 110 €=>641.13(2.1) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XX Trial 
110XX(B) Course and Conduct of Trial in 
General 
110k641 Counsel for Accused 
110k641.13 Adequacy of 
Representation 
110k641.13(2) Particular Cases and 
Problems 
110k641.13(2.1) k. In General. 
Most Cited Cases 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
Page 2 
Any deficiency in counsel's performance in failing 
to obtain rulings on motions for judgment of 
acquittal on two charges was not ineffective 
assistance, as there was no reasonable probability 
that district court would have granted motions, 
given sufficiency of evidence to support charges. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
Before KELLY, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, 
Senior Circuit Judge, and LUCERO, Circuit Judge. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT ™* 
FN* This order and judgment is not 
binding precedent, except under the 
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, 
and collateral estoppel. The Court 
generally disfavors the citation of orders 
and judgments; nevertheless, an order and 
judgment may be cited under die terms and 
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.LUCERO, 
Circuit Judge. 
**1 Kenneth Chee appeals the district court's 
dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, 
set aside, or correct his sentence. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 
2253(a), and we affirm. 
I 
On August 19, 1997, Chee was convicted of 
maiming in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 114, assault 
resulting in serious bodily injuiy in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 113(a)(6), and three counts of sexual 
assault in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) as 
defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2XA). The charges 
against Chee arose from three violent incidents 
against Lynn Dawes, Chee's common-law wife, on 
an Indian reservation in New Mexico. His 
conviction and sentence were affirmed by this 
Court. United States v. Chee, 173 F.3d 864 (10th 
Cir. 1999). 
Chee filed his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion on May 2, 
2000, asserting five claims for relief: (1) ineffective 
assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's failure 
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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(Cite as: 44 Fed.Appx. 289) 
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to request a voluntary intoxication jury instruction; 
(2) ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial 
counsel's failure to obtain a ruling from the trial 
court on his motion for judgment of acquittal on the 
maiming charge; (3) similar error by counsel with 
respect to the trial court's failure to rule on the 
motion for judgment of acquittal on the bodily 
injury charges; (4) abuse of discretion by the trial 
court in upwardly departing six levels in sentencing 
Chee on the maiming and assault resulting in 
serious bodily injury charges; and (5) a similar 
error by the trial court with regard to the sexual 
assault charges. Chee also alleges he received 
ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the 
fourth claim, stating that by not obtaining a ruling 
on his motion for judgment of acquittal, counsel 
caused appellant to be sentenced for convictions 
that should not have been allowed. 
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the 
jury instruction claim, and determined that trial 
counsel was not ineffective in failing to request the 
voluntary intoxication jury instruction because the 
evidence submitted at trial did not support such an 
instruction. The district court rejected all of Chee's 
other claims and denied his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 
motion. Chee appealed and the district court 
granted a certificate of appealability ("COA") on 
the jury instruction claim. 
II 
[1] Ineffective assistance of counsel claims contain 
mixed questions of law and fact that we review de 
novo. Castro v. Ward, 138 F.3d 810, 829 (10th 
Cir.1998). The government argues that Chee has 
procedurally*291 defaulted his ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim-based on trial counsel's 
failure to request a voluntary intoxication jury 
instruction-because he did not raise the underlying 
claim that the jury instructions were inadequate on 
direct appeal. Nonetheless, a procedural bar does 
not apply to habeas claims of ineffective assistance 
of counsel brought by prisoners in federal custody. 
United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1241 
(10th Cir.1995). Therefore this claim is properly 
before us. 
**2 Phillip Medrano, Chee's trial counsel, did not 
request a jury instruction on intoxication as a 
defense to the formation of specific intent, an 
element of the maiming charge. Under Strickland 
v. Washington, Chee must demonstrate that 
Medrano's performance in this respect was deficient 
and that he was prejudiced by the deficient 
performance. 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Deficient performance 
occurs when counsel makes "errors so serious that 
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 
Id. Such performance causes prejudice when 
appellant can show that but for counsel's deficient 
performance there is a reasonable probability that 
the outcome of the proceeding would have been 
different. Id. at 694. 
In an effort to demonstrate deficient performance, 
Medrano testified at the district court evidentiary 
hearing that based on his research he thought that 
although intoxication could be argued as a defense, 
it was not an appropriate jury instruction. He 
further testified that failing to request the jury 
instruction "was a big error" and not a tactical or 
strategic decision. (2 R. at 11.) 
[2] To merit an intoxication jury instruction, the 
evidence presented at trial must establish mental 
impairment due to voluntary intoxication sufficient 
to negate the existence of specific intent. United 
States v. Boyles, 57 F.3d 535, 542 (7th Cir.1995). 
Mere evidence of drinking or intoxication is not 
adequate because it is not evidence of mental 
impairment. Id. Chee incorrectly argues that once " 
the evidence was received at trial that the defendant 
was drunk, the defendant was entitled to the 
instruction on intoxication, so long as his counsel 
asked for it." (Appellant's Br. at 14.) 
The evidence presented at trial showed that Chee 
was frequently drunk and was actually intoxicated 
during the events leading to his conviction. There 
was no evidence indicating that Chee's mental state 
was impaired by his drinking during those events. 
Dawes, the victim, testified that "[h]e's all right 
when he's not drinking," but that "when he's 
drinking, we start arguing over our kids or anything, 
and then that's when he slaps me, punch[es] me." (4 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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R. at 91-92.) However, this statement does not 
indicate that as a result of voluntary intoxication 
Chee was mentally impaired to an extent sufficient 
to negate the existence of specific intent for 
maiming. Because the evidence submitted at trial 
did not support a voluntary intoxication jury 
instruction, die trial court could not have granted a 
request for the instruction. Consequently, Chee's 
counsel was not deficient in not asking for the 
instruction, and Chee was not prejudiced by his 
counsel's failure to request the instruction. 
ni 
[3][4] The district court did not grant a COA on 
Chee's remaining four claims, yet he has briefed 
them on appeal. We decline to issue a COA on 
these four issues because Chee has not made a 
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 
right such that reasonable jurists could *292 debate 
whether the motion should be resolved in a different 
manner. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 
483-84, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000). 
The merits of Chee's alleged trial court 
errors-failure to grant Chee's motion for judgment 
of acquittal on the maiming and bodily injury 
charges, and improper upward departure of six 
levels in sentencing Chee on all charges-were 
addressed by this Court on direct appeal. We held 
that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
convictions and thus refused to reverse the district 
court's denial of Chee's motion for judgment of 
acquittal. Chee, 173 F.3d at —. We also 
concluded that the sentencing enhancements were 
permissible. Id at —. Because these issues 
were decided on direct appeal and Chee has not 
alleged an intervening change in the law of this 
Circuit, we will not consider them on § 2255 
collateral review. United States v. Prichard, 875 
F.2d 789,791 (10th Cir.1989). 
**3 [5][6] Chee asks this Court to reexamine both 
the trial and appellate courts1 rulings on his motion 
for judgment of acquittal on the assault resulting in 
serious bodily injury charge, stating that the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction and that failure to 
reconsider will result in a fundamental miscarriage 
of justice. The jurisdiction argument is based on a 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
claim that there was insufficient evidence to 
establish that the event took place in Indian country 
as well as a claim that the event did not occur within 
the time period alleged in the indictment. We 
reject this argument because Chee stipulated at trial 
that the event took place in Indian country. (5 R. at 
142.) Furthermore, the alleged discrepancy 
between the indictment and the evidence presented 
at trial did not deprive the district court of 
jurisdiction. As we decided in the direct appeal, "a 
discrepancy between the indictment and the facts 
proven at trial... does not bar conviction where time 
is not an element of the offense and the facts 
charged in the indictment show that the offense falls 
within the relevant statute of limitations." Chee, 
173 F.3d at —. Additionally we concluded that the 
evidence was "sufficient to enable a reasonable jury 
to convict Chee of assault beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Id 
[7] These alleged trial court errors also form the 
basis of Chee's ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. Because we concluded during Chee's direct 
appeal that he was not entitled to a judgment of 
acquittal and that his sentencing enhancements were 
permissible, he is unable to demonstrate that but for 
counsel's deficient performance there is a 
reasonable probability that the district court would 
have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal as 
required by Strickland 466 U.S. at 694. 
IV 
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 
C.A.10 (N.M.),2002. 
U.S. v. Chee 
44 Fed.Appx. 289, 2002 WL 532422 (C.A.10 
(N.M.)) 
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